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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW: New Trial for Negligence or Incompetency
of Defense Counsel.- The defendant appeals from a conviction of
rape and kidnapping on the ground that he was not adequately re-
presented by counsel. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. Where
allegedly improper decisions made in conducting defense were, at
most, honest errors in judgment on the part of counsel for defense,
defendant's rights to a fair trial were not violated. Hendrickson v.
State, 118 N.E. 2d 493 (Ind. 1954).
The incompetence of an attorney does not ordinarily constitute a
ground for a new trial. State v. Dangelo, 182 Iowa 1253, 166 N.W.
587 (1918); Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Bank, 23 Wis. 249 (1868).
In civil cases the rule may be regarded as almost invariable. Burton
v. Hynson, 14 Ark. 32 (1853) ; Burton v. Wiley, 26 Vt. 430 (1854).
In criminal cases, and especially those involving the life of the de-
fendant, the court would be justified in adhering to the rule some-
what less strictly. State v. Jones, 12 Mo. App. 93 (1882). But
in any case, to justify a reversal upon this ground, there should be
a strong showing both of incompetency and prejudice. State v.
Benge, 61 Iowa 658, 17 N.W. 100 (1883). The omissions, in-
competency, or neglect of counsel assigned by the court for defendant
in a capital case will be viewed more favorably by the court than
if he had been employed by the prisoner. State v. Williams, 18 Del.
508, 18 Atl. 949 (1890). The Constitution of the United States
guarantees the basic right of assistance of counsel in criminal pro-
ceedings, State v. Farrell, 223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E. 2d 322 (1943), and
along with this constitutional guaranty, the law demands that the
accused have the stout and unswerving loyalty of his chosen or ap-
pointed counsel. Scott v. District of Columbia, 99 A. 2d 641 (Mun.
Ct. App., D.C. 1953). However, the constitutional guaranty of assis-
tance of counsel does not provide that the defendant shall have the
best or most efficient counsel available; and a reversal is not in
order merely because some other attorney might have pursued in a
different manner or presented the case more effectively. People v.
Barnes, 270 IIl. 574, 110 N.E. 881 (1915). Hence, a mere error of
judgment or tactical blunder by counsel for the defense in a criminal
case is not a ground for a new trial. State v. Holden, 42 Minn. 350,
44 N.W. 123 (1890); State v. Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 220, 19 So.
112 (1896). Fraud or betrayal by defense counsel gives equal or
greater cause for granting a new trial than incompetence, ignorance,
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or negligence. State v. Gleentan, 170 Minn. 197, 212 N.W. 203
(1927). A new trial will not be granted solely on the ground that
defendant's counsel was sick, Woolsey v. People, 98 Colo. 62, 53 P.
2d 596 (1935); or intoxicated, State v. Thompson, 56 N.D. 716,
219 N.W. 218 (1928) ; or suffering from fatigue, Tiller v. State, 110
Ga. 250, 34 S.E. 204 (1899) ; or of unsound mind, State v. Bethune,
93 S.C. 195, 75 S. E. 281 (1912). But where defendant is preju-
diced by his counsel's inebriation or incapacity and does not thereby
receive a fair trial, a new trial will be granted. State v. Keller, 57
N.D. 645,223 N.W. 698 (1929).
A survey of both recent and old cases discloses that the rule in
regard to the instant case may be stated almost universally as follows:
A new trial will not be in order because of incompetency, neglect,
or mismanagement by the defense counsel, unless it is of such a
nature and magnitude that the defendant is prejudiced and thereby
prevented from receiving a fair trial. In some jurisdictions the rule
seems to have been applied more rigidly than in others, and the es-
sence of a reversal is founded on a manifest miscarriage of justice.
In any event, prejudice must be shown. The courts have placed
little or no emphasis on the kind of incompetency, neglect or mis-
management; nor have they made any attempt to distinguish or de-
fine these terms, with the exception of fraud. Thus, the determining
factors are the degree and circumstances of incompetency (rather
than species) and its effect on the litigation. These factors are
clearly distinguished in South Carolina's leading authority, State v.
Bethune, supra. Without such a distinction it would appear that
the South Carolina Supreme Court's application of the rule was some-
what harsh. Yet in deciding against the objection of counsel's pre-
judicial mismanagement of the defense in the Bethune case, the court
said: "The mental condition of the appellant's former attorney is
not ground for a new trial, because it has not been made to appear
that it caused prejudice to his case. It does not appear that he did
or left undone anything which would probably have affected the
result." Apparently this rule in the Bethune case is well founded
in law, as it has been cited in various jurisdictions as being both a
leading and a correct ruling.
EDwmam C. RowE.
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE: The Sufficiency of the Evi-
dence to Establish the Corpus Delicti as a Basis for the Introduc.
tion of Confessions. - The court, holding that the details of this
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case are too sordid, does not report all the facts but only those per-
taining to this question of law. Appeal is from adverse judgment
of the circuit court questioning the sufficiency of the evidence to es-
tablish the corpus delicti as a basis for the introduction of the con-
fessions. The State, in its evidence, showed the position of the men
when discovered by the police, the condition of their bodies, the
nature of their clothing, and their location in a secluded spot at one
or two o'clock in the morning. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The
commission by someone of the crime charged need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to make the confession admissible, but
it is enough if the evidence tends to show that the crime was com-
mitted. McElveen et al. v. State, 72 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1954).
It is elementary that before a confession of guilt may be intro-
duced in evidence the State must first prove the corpus delicti, that
is, it must prove that the crime charged has been committed. Adams
v. State, 153 Fla. 68, 13 So. 2d 610 (1943) ; People v. Patton et al.,
284 Mich. 427, 279 N.W. 888 (1938) ; Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 613,
46 So. 166 (1908). In the different jurisdictions there have been
varying degrees of proof required and it is interesting to note the
words used by the different courts. The State must produce evidence
of the corpus delicti sufficient to convince a jury "beyond a reason-
able doubt," Commonwealth v'. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A. 2d 155
(1943); State v. Blocker, 205 S.C. 303, 31 S.E. 2d 908 (1944);
"beyond any question," State v. Benham, 58 Ariz. 129, 118 P. 2d 91
(1941); "proved not beyond a reasonable doubt but beyond all pos-
sible doubt," State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P. 2d 404 (1950) ;
"having been fully proven, confessions were admissible," Moreland
et al. v. State, 24 Ala. App. 160, 132 So. 60 (1931); and in People
v. Mohr, 24 Cal. App. 2d 580, 75 P. 2d 616 (1938), the words used
were "legally proved." An extra-judicial confession should not be
admitted in evidence unless the corpus delicti is established by prima
facie evidence independent of said confession. Pate v. State, 36 Ala.
App. 688, 63 So. 2d 223 (1953) ; Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186
So. 203 (1939). In Keir v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 11 So. 2d 886
(1943), the court ruled that confessions could not be admitted until
there was "at least some prima facie proof of the corpus delicti."
The California rule appears to be that the corpus delicti need be
proved prima facie or by slight evidence to allow confessions ad-
mitted. People v. Smnith, 72 Cal. App. 2d 875, 164 P. 2d 857 (1946) ;
People v. Kaye, 43 Cal. App. 2d 802, 111 P. 2d 679 (1941). In
South Carolina the court makes this statement: "The rule . . .
forbids introduction as to a confession of guilt on part of one charged
[Vol. 7
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until there has been sufficient evidence . . .on the matter of corpus
delicti." State v. Edwards, 173 S.C. 161, 175 S.E. 277 (1934). In
State v. Brown, 103 S.C. 437, 88 S.E. 21 (1916), it was held that
confessions could not be admitted until some evidence of corpus de-
licti was established. Two Alabama cases support the view that if
any facts are proved from which a jury may reasonably infer that
the crime charged has been committed, the confession is admissible.
Rutland v. State, 31 Ala. App. 43, 11 So. 2d 768 (1943); Ratliff
v. State, 212 Ala. 410, 102 So. 621 (1924). On a motion for direction
of verdict of not guilty, evidence to establish the corpus delicti must
be viewed in light most favorable to State. State v. Thomas, 222
S.C. 484, 73 S.E. 2d 722 (1952). The ruling in the instant case,
that there must only be some evidence tending to show the commission
of the crime charged, finds support in the two cases cited herewith.
Ex Parte Schuber, 68 Cal. App. 424, 156 P. 2d 944 (1945) ; Holland
v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897).
The purpose of the rule of law that the State must prove the corpus
delicti before allowing a confession to be introduced is, of course,
to preclude the possibility of a person being punished for a crime
which has not been committed, but to which he has confessed for
reasons better known to himself. In order to accomplish this, it
would seem that the best rule to avoid such happenings would be to
require, as some jurisdictions do, that the corpus delicti must be
proved beyond all reasonable doubt. This would avoid any possibility
of conviction of a person on his confession alone. No doubt some
courts have felt that to require this degree of proof is too great a
burden on the State and therefore have modified the degree of proof
required to such descriptive levels as "beyond any question," "beyond
any possible doubt," "fully proven," "legally proven," etc. Other
degrees of evidence vary from "some" to "sufficient" to "slight." It
appears that the majority rule today is that the State must make out
a prima fade case as to the corpus delicti before allowing confessions.
This seems to be sound in that a prima facie case is rebuttable and
this procedure sets up safeguards to prevent a miscarriage of justice
and still does not make the burden too great on the part of the State.
The rule in the instant case, where there need only be enough evi-
dence which tends to show that the crime was committed, requires
of the State a degree of proof so slight that the dangers of adherence
to such a rule are obvious.
A. RAY HINNANT.
1954]
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REAL PROPERTY - COVENANTS: Whether Covenant in
Deed to Pay Improvement Costs Runs With the Land.- Plaintiff
development company conveyed unimproved lots to defendant's gran-
tors, the deeds of conveyance containing identical covenants that
the conveyed property should bear its part of the cost of the im-
provements of paving adjacent streets and/or putting in water or
sewage lines, in the event the grantor, "or its successors or assigns,
owner or owners of a major portion" of the lots in the subdivision,
should decide to improve the streets or plumbing facilities of the
subdivision. However, there was no covenant on the part of the
grantor to make the said improvements. It was further expressly pro-
vided that this was to be a covenant running with the land, to be a
charge upon the land in whatever hands it should be at the time the
improvements were made. Subsequent to conveyance to the defen-
dant, the plaintiff made certain improvements, and this action was
brought for the proportionate part due under the terms of the cove-
nant. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and defen-
dant appeals. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The intention of the
original parties expressly was that the covenant should run and bind
the grantee, his heirs and assigns, and the intention of the parties
shall govern. Further, the acceptance of a deed containing a cove-
nant binding the grantee is equivalent to the granting of an easement,
and runs with the land. Stevens Co. v. Lisk, et al., 82 S.E. 2d 99
(N.C. 1954).
One of the .essential requirements for a covenant to run with the
land is that it touch and concern the land. Epting v. Leington
Water Power Co., 177 S.C. 308, 181 S.E. 66, 102 A.L.R. 773
(1935); Morse v. Garner, 1 Strob. 514, 47 Am. Dec. 565 (1847).
"If a covenant is such that its performance or non-performance must
affect the nature, quality, value or mode of enjoyment of the de-
mised premises, it is not a mere personal covenant but one that runs
with the land and binds assignees of the covenantor .... " Rosen v.
Wolff, 152 Ga. 578, 110 S.E. 877 (1922), as cited in the Epting
case, supra. It is not necessary, for it to touch and concern, that
the covenant is to be performed on the land itself, so long as it tends
directly or necessarily to enhance its value or render it more bene-
ficial and convenient to those by whom it is occupied. Cheves v.
City Council of Charleston, 140 S.C. 423, 138 S.E. 867 (1927);
Morehouse et al. v. Woodruff et al., 218 N.Y. 494, 113 N.E. 512
(1916); Ricketts v. Enfield Church Warde'ns, [1909] 1 Ch. 544.
Negative or restrictive covenants, binding the grantee to refrain from
doing an act, or to refrain from using his land in a certain way,
[Vol. 7
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have uniformly been held to run in equity, if not at law. McDonald
v. Welborn, 220 S.C. 10, 66 S.E. 2d 327 (1951); Tulk v. Moxhay,
2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). However, there is some
authority to the effect that affirmative covenants, binding the cove-
nantor to do a positive act, will not run with the land, either at
law or in equity. Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114,
L.R.A. 1918E 222, Ann. Cas. 1915B 872, (1913). The basis for this
view rests upon the English decisions, which have held that restric-
tive covenants will be enforceable in equity, Tulk v. Moxhay, supra,
but that affirmative covenants will not run. Haywood v. The Bruns-
wick Pernmanent Benefit Building Society, 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881).
The reasoning of the English courts has been rather vague. Aside
from the naked assertions that an assignee should not be bound to
make expenditures of money, and that the court has no reason to
create a new equity, no reasons have been assigned for the rule.
Haywood v. The Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society,
supra. However, the American jurisdictions which follow this rule
have recognized several exceptions, one of which is that a deed
covenant to pay improvement costs will be enforced against grantees
and their assigns. 165 Broadway Building, Inc. v. City Investing Co.,
et al., 120 F. 2d 813, 818 (2nd Cir. 1941); Neponsit Property Ow-
ers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Sazings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
15 N.E. 2d 793, 118 A.L.R. 973, rehearing denied, 278 N.Y. 704, 16
N.E. 2d 852 (1938). Lawrence Park Realty Co. v. Crichton, 218 App.
Div. 374, 218 N.Y. Supp. 278 (1926). The majority of the Ameri-
can jurisdictions make no distinction between affirmative covenants
and restrictive covenants, and require only that the covenant touch
and concern the land. Walker v. City of Richmond, 173 Ky. 26,
189 S.W. 1122, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1084 (1916); Smith v. Gulf Re-
fining Co., et al., 162 Ga. 191, 134 S.E. 446, 51 A.L.R. 1323 (1926).
There has been little litigation in South Carolina concerning affirma-
tive covenants. However, from the cases which have appeared, it
may be inferred that the court has drawn no essential distinction
between affirmative and restrictive covenants, insofar as whether or
not they will run is concerned. Epting v. Lexington Water Power
Co., supra. The court has mentioned only the requirement that the
covenant touch and concern. Epting v. Lexington Water Power
Co., supra; Pitts v. Brown, et al., 215 S.C. 122, 54 S.E. 2d 538
(1949). An early case indicated the court would enforce covenants
for future acts, or against future evils. Jeter v. Glenn, 9 Rich. 374
(S.C. 1856). A covenant by a municipality to pave streets was held
to run, insofar as the benefit was concerned. Cheves v. City Coun-
19541
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cil of Charleston, supra. In North Carolina, affirmative covenants
have been held to run; however, the law has developed in a different
channel. That jurisdiction has held that the acceptance of a deed
with a covenant binding the grantee is the equivalent of the grant-
ing of an easement, and so runs with the land. Ring v. Mayberry,
168 N.C. 563, 84 S.E. 846 (1915). However, the likening of a
covenant to an easement was originally conceived to circumvent a
requirement in that state that there be such privity of estate as to
establish mutual and simultaneous interest in the same land, and
the analogy has since been so expanded that all deed covenants are
likened to easements. Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N.C. 1 (1870);
Mayberry case, supra. Although the present North Carolina view,
as expressed in the instant case, may in most instances achieve a
result in accord with the majority ruling, it has been criticized on
the ground that an easement is but a claim upon the land, whereas
a covenant is a personal undertaking to act, or to refrain from acting,
in a certain manner. Lingle Water Users' Assn. v. Occidental
Building & Loan Ass'., 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931). In
United States v. Florea, 68 F. Supp. 367 (D. Ore. 1945), it wag
held that the power of a quasi-public utility to collect assessments
for benefits conferred on lands was not an easement, but was analogous
or equivalent to and adjudged as a covenant running with the land.
The judgment of the court in the instant case is in accord with
the great weight of authority, but the reasoning which the court
applies in reaching its decision is decidedly in the minority. It would
be capricious and erroneous to say that the law in North Carolina
is that covenants will in every instance be construed as easements.
The illogical result of such an assertion would be that no reliable
distinction could be drawn between real and personal covenants, and
that the requisites as established in Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 16a
(1583), would in all respects be disregarded. However, this is the
inference to be drawn from the instant case. The tendency of the
courts to liken a covenant to an easement probably has developed
as a method of circumventing the necessity of privity of estate for
the running of a covenant. However, the result is an anomaly in
the law, in the form of the so-called spurious, or false, easement,
burdening the holder of the servient estate with a duty to act, or to
refrain from acting. An easement by its very nature is a right of
one with regard to the land of another. It is a claim only upon the
land, and burdens the holder of the fee only to the extent that he
must refrain from acts inconsistent with the continuance of the right.
It is inconsistent with the whole body of the law of easements to so
[Vol. 7
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expand the field as to include rights of one to demand performance
of an act by another. The fluidity of the law, and the readiness of
the courts to accept a fictional line of reasoning in order to avoid
an unpopular though established rule, where that rule would, if ap-
plied as intended, prevent a desired result, is both laudable and ap-
palling- laudable, for it recognizes that the law must fit the needs
of a people in a particular age; appalling, for it creates inconsisten-
cies in the law which cannot be reconciled, except by acknowledg-
ing that, in the final analysis, each case must be judged upon its own.
merits. In the instant case, the court, relying upon older authority,
feels bound to follow a rule that acceptance of a deed with a covenant
burdening the grantee is equivalent to the granting of an easement.
The basis for that rule rests upon a rule that assignees in fee are
not in sufficient privity of estate to be bound by a covenant. And
so the court has elected to deny that a covenant is a covenant, and
has come to call it an easement. It would appear less to confuse the
law to overrule previous decisions more freely, or to construe them
more liberally, rather than to develop an expansion of a separate
field which by logic should not be so broadened as to include both
covenants and easements under a single classification.
RoBERT F. PLAXCO, JR.
REAL PROPERTY- RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: Requir-
ing Submission of Building Plans to Grantor for Approval - Validity,
Construction, and Effect. -This was a proceeding under the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgment Act for a declaration that the covenant
in plaintiffs' deed ended with the death of the original grantor. Origi-
nal grantor conveyed a subsection of a restricted residential area
to the plaintiffs' vendors, the deed containing, inter alia, a covenant
as follows: ". . and that no dwelling house or other building shall
be erected on the tract until the type and exterior lines of the build-
ing to be erected shall have been approved by [grantor] or by an
architect selected by him . . . ." Conveyance to the plaintiffs
was subject to the covenant contained in the original deed. Original
grantor selected the architect to pass upon and approve or dis-
approve plans for the dwelling houses to be erected in this restricted
residential area. Subsequently, the original grantor died. Plaintiffs
submitted plans for their proposed dwelling house to the named
architect, conforming to all the specific restrictions spelled out in
tangible form in the covenant, but said architect declined to approve
1954]
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the type and exterior lines of the contemplated structure. Plaintiff
brought this proceeding to obtain relief from the above covenant
and judgment was entered declaring that plaintiffs are entitled to
erect a dwelling house "without obtaining the approval of [architect
selected by original grantor] or any other architect as to the type
and exterior lines of the building." On appeal, HELD: Affirmed.
The covenant was personal to the grantor and ended at his death.
Tdian v. Lawton, 82 S.E. 2d 210 (N.C. 1954).
There is an increasing demand by home owners, with the crowded
conditions of modern life in the cities, to have real estate limited
entirely to development for residential purposes. Clark, Covenants
and Interests Running with Land 170 (2d Ed. 1947). The prob-
lem of technical requirements of a covenant running with the land
is not presented here, since ". . . the question is, not whether the
covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted
to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered
into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased." Tulk
v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 15 Eng. Ru. Cas. 254
(1848). Covenants in deeds should be interpreted in favor of the
free use of property and against any restrictions upon use thereof,
Pehlert v. Neff, 152 Pa. Super. 84, 31 A. 2d 446 (1943); Edney
v. Powers, 224 N.C. 441, 31 S.E. 2d 372 (1944), and construed so
as to carry into effect the intention of the parties, which is to be
collected from the whole instrument and circumstances surrounding
its execution. Cheves v. City Council of Charleston, 140 S.C. 423,
138 S.E. 867 (1927); Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199
Ga. 353, 34 S.E. 2d 522 (1945). A building restriction will not
be inferred to be personal when it can be construed to be appurte-
nant to land. Baker v. Lunde, 96 Conn. 530, 114 Atl. 673 (1921).
And restrictive building covenants are personal to the grantor if no
building scheme is found. Jennings v. Baroff, 104 N.J. Eq. 132,
144 Atl. 717, 60 A.L.R. 1219 (1929). General building schemes will
be upheld if not against public policy. Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co.,
121 Ohio St. 56, 166 N.E. 887 (1929). If building restrictions con-
tained in a deed are within reasonable bounds and the intention of
the parties is clear, such restrictions will be upheld as not against pub-
lic policy. Jones v. Northwest Real Estate Co., 149 Md. 271, 131
AtI. 446 (1925). Power to approve plans must be reasonably and
not arbitrarily exercised. Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal. 2d
442, 211 P. 2d 302, 19 A.L.R. 2d 1268 (1949). Covenants restrict-
ing land to commercial use with power given to committee to approve
or disapprove plans for the proposed business are valid. Hoffman
[Vol. 7
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v. Balka, 104 A. 2d 188 (Pa. 1954). A covenant to erect no build-
ing on land conveyed without approval of the grantor, except a fill-
ing station, is personal and does not run with the land retained.
Chappell v. Winslow, 144 F. 2d 160 (4th Cir. 1944). Restrictive
covenants not to use realty conveyed for purpose of conducting a
mercantile business thereon without written consent of grantors,
their children or grandchildren, have been held to be personal and
terminated when the grantor sold the business they sought to pro-
tect. Allison v. Greear, 188 Va. 64, 49 S.E. 2d 279 (1948). Plans
for a proposed dwelling cannot be disapproved so as to leave the
grantee subject to the mere whim of the grantor. Exchange Realty
Co. v. Bird, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 391 (1933) as cited in Hannula v. Haci-
enda Homes, supra. A covenant in a deed not to erect any struc-
ture without the approval of the grantor or his legal representative
has been construed as a lawful contract and inured to the benefit of
other lot owners in the plan including th6 plaintiffs (grantor and
others). Harmon v. Burow, 263 Pa. 188, 106 Atl. 310 (1919).
Since Tulk v. Moxhay, supra, restrictive covenants have been en-
forced in courts of equity. With the increased demand for re-
stricted residential developments, the courts have gone far in up-
holding restrictions which require that: the land be used only for
residential purposes; only single dwelling houses at a certain mini-
mum cost be built; dwellings be only one story high with certain
setback lines from street and side lines. Pennsylvania indicated in
Harmon v. Burow, supra, that a covtenant in a deed calling for ap-
proval by the grantor or his legal representative of plans for any
structure to be erected on the land conveyed, was valid and ran
with the land. The court paid particular attention to the phrase,
"The grantor or his legal representatives," and construed it to mean
heirs, executors, administrators or assigns. The North Carolina
Supreme Court in considering the instant case construed "...
[grantor] or an architect selected by him . . ." to mean grantor
or his agent, and that the death of the principal terminated the au-
thority of the agent. It would seem that the courts should choose
some point and declare that they would go no further in enforcing
restrictive covenants. To say that plans must be submitted to the
grantor for his approval and that they must harmonize with his
aesthetic sense is going rather far. Ohio, in the Exchange Realty
case, supra, said that the grantee would not be held to the mere
whim of the grantor. The Virginia Supreme Court in Allison v.
Greear, supra, said, "From the language in the restriction itself read
in the light of its purpose as testified to by the [grantors], the con-
1954]
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clusion is inescapable that, if valid, it is not a covenant running
with the land." [Emphasis added] In the instant case the North
Carolina Supreme Court left the door open to declare such covenants
invalid if it is ever squarely presented before it as was said by Jus-
tice Ervin, when he made the statement, "We take it for granted
without so deciding for the purpose of this particular case that the
covenant in question was valid in law at the time of its insertion ird
the deed to the plaintiffs' grantors." [Emphasis added] Of the
very limited authority found on this question, one case, Harmon v.
Burow, supra, definitely held that the covenant was valid; other
cases were decided on different questions of law, but there were
indications that some of the courts had some doubt as to the validity
of the covenant. It appears that the better view would be to declare
such covenants invalid by reason of their vagueness.
MmIviN L. RoBnRTs.
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